Emory University School of Law

Emory Law Scholarly Commons
Emory Corporate Governance and
Accountability Review Perspectives

Journals

1-1-2016

Is Your Company at Risk of an Activist Attack? Outsmarting Wolf
Packs
Zalak Raval

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/ecgar-perspectives
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Zalak Raval, Is Your Company at Risk of an Activist Attack? Outsmarting Wolf Packs, 4 Emory Corp.
Governance & Accountability Rev. Perspectives 1017 (2016).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/ecgar-perspectives/21

This Perspective is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Emory Law Scholarly Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Emory Corporate Governance and Accountability Review Perspectives by an
authorized administrator of Emory Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact law-scholarlycommons@emory.edu.

RAVAL GALLEYSPROOFS

2/27/2021 11:16 AM

IS YOUR COMPANY AT RISK OF AN ACTIVIST ATTACK?
OUTSMARTING WOLF PACKS
Wolves show deference to the leader in their pack by allowing them to be
the first to eat. In the current hedge fund 1 activism era, a wolf pack is formed
when a lead investor acquires a sizable stake in a company, gathers and then
divulges valuable nonpublic information to fellow activists to encourage them
to purchase less than 5 percent stock in the same company, and avoid SEC
shareholder disclosure rules. Not only are the SEC Shareholder disclosure rules
vague, but the real challenge is to give teeth to monitoring them as there is no
clear enforceable law. A lead or “an activist investor is an individual or group
that purchases large number of public company’s shares and/or tries to obtain
seats on the company’s board with the goal of effecting a major change in the
company.” 2 This goal is accomplished by waging proxy battles, liquidating
assets and forcing sales of companies. 3 One example of this unchecked
investment strategy is of Jana Partners forcing PetSmart into a leveraged
buyout in 2014. 4 Jana Partners, the hedge-fund “cumulatively owned less than
20 percent of PetSmart, but received a windfall of 40 percent return on its
investment.” 5
The lead investor and fellow activists who acquire “5 percent or more of an
issuer’s stock must file a Schedule 13D with the SEC under section 13(d) of
the Williams Act.” 6 A group of investors who “collectively own 5 percent or
more of a company’s stock, is required to jointly file a Schedule 13D.” 7 A
group is formed when, “investors act together, or agree to act together for the
purpose of acquiring, holding, voting, or disposing of an issuer’s securities.” 8
There is no bright line test for determining the formation of a group. This
1 Justin Kuepper, Activist Hedge Funds: Follow The Trail To Profit, http://www.investopedia.com/
articles/mutualfund/06/activisthedgefund.asp (explaining hedge funds are lightly regulated private investment
funds that use unconventional investment strategies and tax shelters in an attempt to make extraordinary
returns in any market).
2 http://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/activist-investor.asp.
3 Kuepper, supra note 1.
4 William R. Tevlin, Conscious Parallelism of Wolf Packs: Applying the Antitrust Conspiracy
Framework to Section 13(d) Activist Group Formation, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2335, 2338 (2016),
http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol84/iss5/17/.
5 Id.
6 Id. at 2337.
7 Id.
8 Id at 2338.
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creates a loophole for activists to exploit. Activists intentionally avoid a group
status in order to avoid the 13(d) disclosure requirement. The renowned
activist, Carl Icahn, has admitted, “there are bad activists. [A]ll they want to do
is get in and rock the boat and make a quick trade.” 9 Consequently, it is
imperative that courts have clear guidelines to resolve uncertainties that
develop from an investment strategy aimed at exploiting loopholes in SEC
disclosure rules.
There has been an alarming growth in wolf pack momentum all across the
United States in a short span of time. Nine of the Fortune 100 and 38 of the
Fortune 500 companies dealt with an activist campaign in 2015 10, including
big names like Sotheby’s, DuPont and Allergan. Furthermore, wolf pack
activism is not confined to large public companies. It impacts all businesses. In
2015 alone, 343 public US companies were targets; 113 have been targeted as
of May 2016. 11
This perspective will examine the United States’ Congress’s commitment
to curb uncertainty surrounding wolf pack investment strategy. It will begin by
addressing how wolf packs exploit targeted industries. It will then discuss
proposed legislation to reform SEC loopholes used by wolf packs, more
specifically, it will discuss the legal solution offered by the Brokaw Act and
the ValueAct Settlement. Lastly, it will conclude with solutions in addition to
the ones already proposed.
How Does A Wolf Pack Avoid Section 13(d) Disclosure Requirement?
Section 13(d) serves the main purpose of providing notice to management
and shareholders alike when there is a large issuance of stock to a third party. 12
“A Schedule 13D filing must state, “the filer’s identity, funding source,
investment purpose, number of shares, and information about contracts,
arrangements or understandings with another person pertaining to the target
company.” 13 A wolf pack avoids section 13(d) disclosures in four ways. (1) It
9 David Benoit and Vipal Monga, Are Activist Investors Helping or Undermining Companies?, Wall St.
J. (Oct. 5, 2015, 1:55PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/activist-investors-helping-or-hindering-1444067712.
10 Paula Loop, Is Your Company at Risk for an Activist Attack?, PwC LLP, (July 28, 2016), https://
corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/07/28/is-your-company-at-risk-for-an-activist-attack/ (Suggesting Activists are
a new class of hedge fund that has grown tremendously: their AUM have surged 268% from 2010 to 2015
alone. They don’t just invest in a stock to make a profit; they shake up companies in which they invest and
actively try to shape future performance).
11 Id.
12 See GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 717 (2nd Cir. 1971).
13 Tevlin, supra note 4, at 2339.
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simply avoids detection by acquiring less than 5 percent stake in a company;
(2) it blindsides corporate management and shareholders by having only the
lead activist disclose its ownership stake; (3) it undermines future disclosures
by using the ten-day window before filing; and (4) it exploits exemption 13(d)one for passive investors.
First, the activists as a group may avoid detection if each activist investor
acquires less than a five percent stake in the target. 14 Currently, it is hard for
corporate boards and courts alike to identify and classify activist shareholders
who purchase less than a five percent stake as a group. Upon SEC’s inquiry
whether Bulldog Investors had any agreements with Foundation Asset
Management, a fund that ran a proxy fight at the same company as the
Bulldog, Bulldog’s co-founder Phil Goldstein’s response was: “If you go to a
Grateful Dead concert, you’re going to find a lot of Grateful Dead fans. They
are not a group. They just like the same music.” 15 Second, when only the lead
activist shareholder acquires and discloses a large stake in the target, the
management underestimates the overall influence of that lead activist
concomitant with fellow activists. These fellow activists purchase a smaller
share in the company, but their combined stake is significant. “For example, in
the fight over control of Barnes & Noble, the lead activist investor held an
18.7% stake in the company.” 16 However, the wolf pack as a whole controlled
a 36.14% stake. 17
Third, the ten-day window under Section 13(d) allows for too much time
for investors to accumulate significant ownership before filing, thereby
undermining any future disclosures. 18 Wolf packs are able to purchase large
amounts of stocks largely undetected at a lower cost, since the stock price is
generally cheaper prior to filing, as the market is not yet alerted of the
acquisition. Fourth, wolf packs avoid Schedule 13(d) disclosure by using an
exemption 13(d)-one for passive investors, pursuant to which they may
beneficially own more than five percent but less than ten percent and need only

14 Carmen S.W. Lu, Unpacking Wolf Packs, http://www.yalelawjournal.org/comment/unpacking-wolfpacks (suggesting Congress believed disclosures were necessary to ensure shareholders were promptly alerted
to possible changes in company management and corporate control).
15 Liz Hoffman, Aruna Viswanatha and David Benoit, SEC Probes Activist Funds Over Whether They
Secretly Acted in Concert, Wall St. J. (June 4, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-probes-activist-fundsover-whether-they-secretly-acted-in-concert-1433451205.
16 Yucaipa Am. All. Fund II, L.P. v. Riggio, 1 A.3d 310, 324 (Del. Ch. 2010).
17 Id.
18 Lu, supra note 14.
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disclose through a short-form public filing. 19 Here, wolf packs have longer
than ten days for under the radar asset accumulations and may assertively and
publicly advocate for strategic courses of action within the company.
Proposed Legislation—The Brokaw Act and The ValueAct Settlement
The wolf pack momentum necessitates a clear enforceable law for restoring
a balance between control-seeking activists and board’s management
independence. The Brokaw Act 20 aims to end the exploitation of loopholes
found in Williams Act of 1968, 21 and offers four solutions.
First, it mandates the SEC to shorten the time for hedge funds to file
Schedule 13D to two business days from ten business days to prevent tipping
and disclosures of nonpublic information to make a profit. 22 So far, the SEC
has been reluctant to use the authority given to it under Dodd-Frank 23 to
shorten the 13D filing period as it may be exposed to criticism from
institutional investors, who believe that the activists are ensuring corporate
board’s accountability. Second, it requires the SEC to expand the definition of
beneficial ownership to include, in addition to voting or investment power, a
direct or indirect pecuniary interest in the security. 24 This helps to make
calculations about a wolf pack’s long and short term interests and whether they
align well with the target company’s interests. 25
Third, it would define “person” to include two or more people, “working
together to evade the requirements of” the Williams Act. 26 This will essentially
help identify smaller hedge funds that would benefit by the takeover. Fourth,
Section 13 of the Exchange Act would be amended to add a broad concept of
“short interest” and to require filing similar to Schedule 13D upon acquisition

19 Ethan A. Klingsberg, et al., What the ValueAct Complaint Means for Activism Tactics and the SEC’s
Beneficial Ownership Reporting Regime, (May 12, 2016), http://www.clearymawatch.com/2016/05/what-thevalueact-complaint-means-for-activism-tactics-and-the-secs-beneficial-ownership-reporting-regime/.
20 S.2720, 114th Cong. (2015–2016).
21 Tevlin, supra note 4, at 2339 (explaining The Williams Act was added as an amendment to the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in 1968, it governs acquisitions and tender offers).
22 Id.
23 See 12 U.S.C. § 5491 (Dodd-Frank Act § 1011).
24 Cydney Posner, Senate Bill introduced to reform 13D reporting by closing “loophole” exploited by
activist hedge funds, (Mar. 29, 2016), https://cooleypubco.com/2016/03/29/senate-bill-introduced-to-reform13d-reporting-by-closing-loophole-exploited-by-activist-hedge-funds/.
25 Id.
26 Id.
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of beneficial ownership of short interests aggregating five percent or more of
the same class, regardless of the form of short interest. 27
In addition to the Brokaw Act’s futuristic solutions to close loopholes, the
recent ValueAct settlement by DOJ closed a loophole used by wolf packs to
evade Schedule 13D filing by using a narrow exemption under 13(d)-one that
permits delayed filings by using Schedule 13G. The exemption is a part of the
HSR Act28 and states that purchasers of less than ten percent of a company’s
outstanding voting securities are not required to notify the DOJ and FTC if the
acquisition is made “solely for the purpose of investment” with no intention of
participating in the company’s business decisions. 29 The ValueAct precedent
assures that wolf packs are not able to avoid detection by positioning
themselves as passive investors (when in fact they are cooperating with
shareholders or taking an assertive role with portfolio companies) for the
purposes of qualifying for a less timely and burdensome Schedule 13G filing
in lieu of the tighter, more transparent 13D requirements. 30 Effective August 1,
2016, the maximum civil penalties for failure to file HSR increased from
US$16,000 per day to US$40,000 per day. 31
Conclusion
Six solutions must be considered to make the wolf pack tactic less
formidable. First, enforceable law is required. The next logical step would be
the passing and signing into law of the Brokaw bill. Second, shareholders who
did not invest with the intention to join forces with activists but who later
decide to do so must collectively come together and disclose themselves as a
group. This will force wolf pack leaders to disclose names of investors who
join them in their proxy battles to overthrow corporate management. Third,
corporations should be on a lookout for affiliations between coinciding new
buyers and the activist who has recently filed Schedule 13D. The shortening of
27

Id.
Klingsberg, supra note 19. (explaining that the Hart-Scott Rodino Act (“HSR”) requires that before
any entity accumulates more than $78.2 million of a company’s stock, the prospective purchaser must notify
the issuer, file a notification with the U.S. antitrust agencies and wait for the expiration or early termination of
the 30-day waiting period).
29 Rosemary Lally, Recent DOJ Move Could Have Implications for Institutional Investors, (Apr. 14,
2016), http://www.cii.org/article_content.asp?edition=4&section=13&article=737.
30 Klingsberg, supra note 18.
31 Michael B. Bernstein and Justin P. Hedge, Continued Enforcement of HSR Violations and Increased
Civil Monetary Penalties Reinforce Need for Investor Compliance Monitoring, (Aug. 16, 2016),
http://www.arnoldporter.com/en/perspectives/publications/2016/08/continued-enforcement-of-hsr.
28
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the filing window in the bill may minimize the time required for tipping of
nonpublic information. Nevertheless, underhand transactions may still occur.
Fourth, corporate boards should increase transparency and build better
relations with shareholders. It may help gauge their votes for proxy battles.
Almost 60 percent of campaigns targeting $25 billion-plus market cap
companies were initiated by activists who owned less than one percent of
shares outstanding at announcement. 32 In lieu of engaging and increasing
transparency, companies should make shareholders and directors alike aware
when any amount of shares have been sold, depending on the company size,
each company may internally decide the number. Fifth, businesses should keep
detailed information regarding wolf pack manipulation of assets as well as
their own business vulnerabilities. They may do so by reexamining their
governance structure and preemptively adopting proposals by wolf packs;
granted they are consistent with the company’s long-term value creation. This
will help minimize the foreseeable activists’ influence and keep the wolf packs
at distance. Lastly, even though the ValueAct Settlement has brought clarity
concerning the 13G exemption of 13D filings, there must be enforceable law
that defines and distinguishes active and passive investing to avoid any
confusion that compels legal action.
Considering that there is still no bright line test for U.S. courts to address
wolf pack investment strategy, one must question how genuinely concerned
SEC is about controlling wolf packs. SEC Chairman Mary Jo White stated
that, “Our role at the SEC is not to determine whether activist campaigns are
beneficial or detrimental in any given circumstance, the agency’s central focus
is making sure that shareholders are provided with the information they need
and that all play by the rules.” 33 The Brokaw bill will compel this notion by
mandating disclosures before it is too late.
ZALAK RAVAL ∗
32 J.P. Morgan, The Activist Revolution, Understanding and Navigating a New World of Heightened
Scrutiny, (Jan. 2015), https://www.jpmorgan.com/jpmpdf/1320693986586.pdf.
33 Hoffman, supra note 15.
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